This paper presents a monetary model in which consumption and capital investment can undergo upswings and downturns in the presence of collateral constraints. When the collateralized asset has a liquidation value below its full value, we show that a stable cyclical equilibrium can emerge in consumption and capital investment around the unstable steady state.
This paper explores the idea that the borrowing limits faced by agents can cause economic fluctuations. The current downturn, which has caught many households heavily indebted against the value of their homes, is a case in point. 1 We propose a monetary model where economy-wide downturns and upswings can occur through the interaction between capital investment and consumption. In our economy, consumption loans are available to agents but with market frictions, they are limited by the productive asset that agents can use as collateral, such as real estate or capital assets. Since the capital asset serves both as productive input and collateral, the borrowing limit of agents constitutes a channel through which capital investment and future consumption interact with each other over time. When the asset has a liquidation value below the market price for its productive use, we show that the economy experiences a cyclical behavior in consumption, capital accumulation and the interest rate.
To be specific, the environment -which we proposed in an earlier paper, Ferraris and Watanabe (2008) -nests a model of credità la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) into a standard divisible money search modelà la Lagos and Wright (2005) . Market frictions make money emerge as a medium of exchange and prevent credit systems from working smoothly. Agents must commit an amount of their capital asset to obtain consumption loans from banks. The banks are able to seize and liquidate the committed capital if repayment does not happen. We extend the environment to explore a situation where the liquidation value to the bank may be below the full value of the asset to its owner. Our approach is to use the liquidation value of the asset as an exogenous (bifurcation) parameter, and to examine if endogenous fluctuations can occur within the admissible parameter space.
Within this framework, we found that the dynamics in our model depend critically on whether agents are below or at their borrowing limits. In the former circumstance, the economy exhibits a dichotomous nature -fluctuations may occur in consumption if agents are sufficiently risk averse, but never occur in capital accumulation. This result is in line with Lagos and Wright (2003) who investigate the dynamics of a monetary search model without capital and credit. In the latter circumstance, capital investment and future consumption interact with each other over time. Therefore, when agents are at their borrowing limits, fluctuations can occur in both consumption and capital investment. In particular, when the liquidation value of the asset equals a critical value, a period doubling bifurcation occurs and a stable cycle emerges close to the unique but unstable steady state. A transversality argument allows us to prove existence of stationary sunspot equilibria close to the deterministic cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, derives the equilibrium dynamics and contains a discussion of the related literature. Section 3 concludes.
All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
The Model

The Environment
The model builds on a competitive version of Lagos and Wright (2005) , where agents take prices as given in each market described below. Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided into two sub-periods, called day and night. A perfectly competitive market opens in each sub-period. During the day, agents can trade a perishable consumption good and face randomness in their preferences and production possibilities. An agent is a buyer with probability σ in which case he wants to consume but cannot produce, whereas an agent is a seller with probability 1−σ in which case he is able to produce but does not wish to consume. A consumption during the day q yields utility u(q), satisfying u (·) > 0, u (·) < 0, u (0) = ∞, and u (∞) = 0, where the (double) dash " " (" ") stands for the first (second) derivative. The initial value is denoted by q 0 . A production during the day q p requires utility cost c (q p ) = q p . During the night, agents can trade a durable good that can be used for production or consumption. In contrast to the first sub-period, there is no randomness in the second sub-period. Agents obtain utility given by U (x) = x during the night, where x represents consumption of night-time goods. Simultaneously, agents can produce these goods using capital and labor. Agents have access to a neoclassical production technology f (k) for capital k that satisfies f (0) = 0, f (·) > 0, f (·) < 0, f (0) = ∞, and f (∞) = 0. Capital depreciates at a rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. Production technology of labor is linear and one-to-one, and labor effort e costs C(e) = e in terms of utility. Agents discount future payoffs at a rate β ∈ (0, 1) across periods, but we assume for simplicity that there is no discounting between the two sub-periods.
There is an intrinsically worthless good, which is perfectly divisible and storable, called fiat money. We assume that, during the day, trades are anonymous and so trading histories of agents are private knowledge. Combined with the presence of randomness described above, anonymity motivates an essential role of money: sellers must receive money for immediate compensation of their products. The total supply of fiat money, denoted by M , is fixed and M is constant over time.
Each period, agents can contact a private bank, in order to deposit their money or obtain a loan, denoted by d, or l, respectively. This happens before entering the day market, but after having discovered whether they are going to be buyers or sellers. As in goods trades, agents are anonymous in financial transactions and their credit histories are private knowledge. While banks do not have technologies that allow them to punish borrowers by excluding them from future financial transactions in case of default, the debt repayment can be ensured by using collateral. Should they find themselves in need of a loan for day-time consumption, agents can commit part or all of their physical capital as a guarantee of repayment. 2 If the loan is not paid back, then the bank has the right to seize and liquidate the committed collateral.
Given the environment described above, there is no benefit for buyers to deposit their money because they will be able to use it for consumption, and for sellers to borrow money because they have no use for it during the day. Hence, in the monetary equilibrium with bank credit described below, buyers are borrowers while sellers are depositors in their credit deals with banks. In what follows, we assume that the value banks can recover in case the borrower defaults can be less than the full value of the capital, i.e. in a liquidation the asset is not necessarily worth its entire value, for instance because the owner customizes the asset in the meantime. Formally, if a buyer holds capital k at a given period, then on that day he can borrow l in total, as long as it satisfies
where φ is the value of a unit of money, z the liquidation value of capital and i the nominal interest rate. z ∈ (0, 1] is an exogenous parameter and constant over time. The L.H.S. of the above inequality represents the real-valued repayment of his debt. The repayment cannot exceed the liquidation value of the collateral zk, because banks know that in case a borrower defaults on a payment, they can only recover a fraction z of the productive value of the capital k. Therefore, the buyer faces an upper bound on the amount of borrowing. Note that the repayment happens before capital is chosen for the next period, and the above inequality holds for every period.
The first best solution in our economy, denoted by q * , q * s , k * , (x − e) * , is fairly trivial and is characterized by the first order conditions, u (q * b ) = 1 and βF (k * ) = 1, and the feasibility
The standard interpretation follows: at the optimum, the marginal utility of day-time consumption (= u (q * )) equals to the marginal cost of production (= 1), while the marginal utility of nighttime consumption (= 1) equals to the discounted value of the marginal returns of capital (= βF (k * )).
Monetary equilibrium
In what follows, we construct symmetric equilibria with money and credit. We first describe the decision problem of individual agents taking the market prices p, φ, i > 0 as given.
Night market As already mentioned, during the night, agents trade, consume and produce durable goods, and clear their credit balances. The expected value of an agent, who has been a buyer, entering the night market in a given period with holdings m of money, l of loans, and
where Solving the budget constraint (1) for x − e and substituting it into the value function, the first order conditions with respect to m +1 and k +1 are respectively
where
It is clear from these expressions that m +1 , k +1 are determined independently of both m, k, and hence all agents hold the same amount of money and capital at the beginning of any given day market.
Day market Agents during the day either consume and borrow as buyers or produce and deposit as sellers. All agents start any given period with the same amount of money and capital holdings. The expected value of an agent, V (m, k), entering the day market with m and k, satisfies:
where p is the nominal price of day-time goods. If the agent happens to be a buyer (which happens with probability σ), then he spends an amount pq for his consumption, which is no greater than his initial money holdings m and a loan l that he takes out from a bank. The loan l is limited by the value of capital zk he has accumulated from the previous night. If the agent happens to be a seller (which happens with probability 1 − σ), then he produces q p and obtains pq p . At the same time, he deposits an amount d which is no greater than his initial money holdings m. The agent then moves on to the night market with the remaining amount of money, m + l − pq when a buyer or m − d + pq p when a seller.
The first order conditions are:
where λ ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the buyer's budget constraint, γ ≥ 0 the multiplier of the credit constraint, ρ ≥ 0 the multiplier of the seller's deposit constraint. Here,
, and the envelop conditions of the night-time problem imply that W m = φ and
Some properties of the optimal choices in the day-market follow immediately from the above conditions. First, (5) implies
since the seller produces up to the point where the marginal costs of production per unit of money at day (= 1/p) and at night (= φ) are equal. Second, (4), (5), (6) yield
The first equality implies that the complementary slackness condition for the credit constraint
Observe that for γ = 0, we have u (q) = 1 + i and zk ≥ φ(1 + i)l in which case the buyer borrows up to the point where the marginal benefit of an extra unit of loan (= u (q)) equals the marginal cost (= 1 + i). For γ > 0, we have u (q) > 1 + i and zk = φ(1 + i)l in which case the credit constraint is binding and the marginal benefit of a loan exceeds its marginal cost.
Notice that i > 0 implies u (q) > 1 and so λ > 0. Hence, the second equality above implies that, given φ > 0, the complementary slackness condition for the buyer's budget constraint
Finally, (7) yields φi = ρ, hence the complementary slackness condition for the seller's deposit
In what follows, we make a tie-breaking assumption such that, if indifferent, sellers deposit their money so that
holds for all i ≥ 0.
Euler equations We now derive the Euler equations. Using (2), (4), (7), (8) 
where subscript +1 stands for the next period. In the above equation, the marginal cost of obtaining one unit of money today (= φ) equals the discounted value of its expected marginal benefit obtained tomorrow. The marginal value of money is the marginal utility (= u (q +1 )) when a buyer, or an interest payment of an extra unit of deposit (= 1 + i +1 ) when a seller.
Similarly, using (3), (4), (6), (8) and the envelope conditions,
∂k + σγz and
, with an updating, we obtain the Euler equation for capital holdings
This time, the marginal cost of capital investment today (= 1) equals the discounted value of its expected marginal benefit accruing tomorrow. The future benefit of an additional capital consists of two parts. On the one hand, the agent obtains the marginal returns (= F (k +1 )) for the following night-time production. On the other hand, if the agent turns out to be a buyer, then he will be able to borrow an extra amount of funds equal to
The extra loans will then generate the net benefit of an additional consumption represented by the marginal utility of day-time consumption (= u (q +1 )) minus the repayment cost (= 1 + i +1 ). The latter benefit is absent when the credit constraint is slack, i.e. when u (q + ) = 1 + i +1 . In this case, capital is at the efficient level k +1 = k * , satisfying βF (k * ) = 1, and is constant over time. When the credit constraint is binding, the capital investment decision needs to take into account the borrowing limit and its effect on future consumption. The higher the net benefit of getting a loan as a buyer (= u (q +1 )/(1 + i +1 ) − 1), the larger the capital investment. In this case, the binding credit constraint constitutes a channel through which capital and consumption interact each other over time.
Characterization of the monetary equilibrium The last requirement of our equilibrium is to determine the market prices p, φ, i > 0 which have taken as given so far. Each of the prices are determined by the respective market-clearing condition. For the day-time goods market, since all buyers buy q and all sellers sell q p at any given period,
For the night-time goods market, notice that the level of night-time consumption is bound to differ across agents depending on their day-time activity, while the level of capital holdings is not. The night-market clearing condition becomes
where X denotes the aggregate night-time consumption net of aggregate labor effort averaged over buyers and sellers. For the loans and deposits market, the credit-market clearing condition is given by
Definition 1 A monetary equilibrium with collateralized credit is a set of prices and quantities that satisfies the budget constraint (1), the first order condition and the Euler equations (8), (12), (13), the complementary slackness conditions (9), (10), (11), and the market-clearing conditions (14) , (15), (16).
As already mentioned, the total money supply is constant at M in our economy. Using m = M , (8), (10) , (11), (16), we have φ = σq/M , φ +1 = σq +1 /M and φl = (1 − σ)q. Applying them to (9) and(12), the problem can be reduced to identify (q, q +1 , k +1 , i +1 ) that satisfy (13) and
For given value of z ∈ (0, 1], we first characterize the steady state equilibrium denoted by q s , k s , i s . To guarantee the existence of steady state equilibrium, we assume 3 :
where q is the solution to βu (q) = 1 and q the solution to βσu (q) = 1 − β(1 − σ). Define
, then a steady state equilibrium exists without biding credit constraint and is unique, satisfying q s =q, k s = k * and i s > 0. Otherwise, there exists z ∈ (0, 1) such that for z ∈ (z, z] = ∅, a steady state equilibrium exists with biding credit constraint and is unique, satisfying q s ≤q, k s ≥ k * and i s > 0.
The result extends Ferraris and Watanabe (2008) where we studied a steady state equilibrium assuming z = 1. Here, whether or not the credit constraint is binding in steady state can be stated in terms of the liquidation value of collateral z. For sufficiently high values of z, the credit constraint is not binding and it holds that u (·) = 1 + i. In this case, (12) and (13) determine respectively q s =q and k s = k * in separation. For sufficiently low values of z, the credit constraint is binding and it holds that u (·) > 1 + i. In this case, q s ≤q, k s ≥ k * , i s > 0 are jointly determined. When the constraint is binding, a larger liquidation value of collateral implies a larger amount of loans buyers can make, which increases the amount of consumption and pushes up the interest rate in the steady state equilibrium.
Corollary 1
The borrowing limit zk s , the interest rate i s , and consumption q s are all increasing in the liquidation value of collateral, z ∈ (z, z) in steady state.
Dynamics
We now analyze the dynamic behaviors of the monetary equilibrium. Notice from (13) that in our model capital in any given period is determined once the consumption at that period is identified. Further, as (18) shows, whether or not the credit constraint is binding is determined period by period. When the constraint is binding, the dynamics in our model can therefore be described by a single equation,
where k +1 (q +1 ) is defined by
i.e, the Euler equation (13) and the binding credit constraint, zk +1 = (1 − σ)(1 + i)q +1 . When the credit constraint is slack, it holds that G(·) = βq +1 u (q +1 ). In any case, the map G is single-valued for any q +1 ≥ 0, while its inversion G −1 can be generally multi-valued.
In what follows, we derive a periodic solution to (21). The necessary condition for the existence of periodic solution, i.e. a cycle, is that G should not be monotone nondecreasing in all q +1 ≥ 0 -a cycle must have a peak and a trough. This implies, we must have
for some q +1 ≥ 0, where
Here, α(q) ≡ −qu (q)/u (q) > 0 represents the relative risk aversion and θ(k) ≡ −kf (k)/f (k) > 0 the elasticity of the marginal product of capital. To simplify the analysis we assume θ(k) = θ for all k. As k +1 (·) < 0 if and only if α(·) > 1, it follows that Lemma 1 For a periodic solution to exist in a monetary equilibrium given by Definition 1, it is necessary that the coefficient of risk aversion satisfy α(q +1 ) > 1 for some q +1 ≥ 0.
We now concentrate our attention on a periodic orbit of order two, i.e, a fixed point of G•G.
We first show that global bifurcations can occur when a non-monetary steady state equilibrium (q, q +1 ) = (0, 0) is a solution to (21). Below we consider a case in which q +1 = G −1 (q) displays a backward-bending form as often used in the OLG literature (see Azariadis (1993) and the references therein).
Proposition 1 Assume qu (q) = 0 and α(q) < 1 at q = 0. There exists a critical value α z,θ ∈ [2, ∞) such that if α(q s ) > α z,θ , then there exists a periodic solution, q l , q h > 0 satisfying q l < q s < q h for all z ∈ (z, 1] and k l , k h > 0 satisfying k l < k s < k h for z ∈ (z, z]. Further, the critical value α z,θ is constant at α z = 2 for z ∈ [z, 1], decreasing in z ∈ (z, z) and is increasing in θ ∈ (0, ∞).
The assumptions in the proposition guarantee a non-monotonic liquidity function G(q +1 ), and q = G(q + ) and q +1 = G −1 (q) intersect at least twice off the 45 degree line. Then, a periodic
The condition α(q s ) > α z is in line with Lagos and Wright (2005) , who derive bifurcations for a sufficiently high curvature of u(·) without capital and credit. For z ∈ (z, 1], the credit constraint is not binding at the fixed point q s = G(q s ). In this case, consumption can bifurcate if α(q) > α z,θ = 2 but capital remains constant k = k * . Within this region it holds that u (q) = 1 + i each period, thereby high periods are accompanied by a low price, a low interest rate, and a high consumption, whereas low periods are accompanied by a high price, a high interest rate, and a low consumption.
For z ∈ (z,z], the credit constraint is binding, and both consumption and capital can bifurcate if α(·) > α z,θ ≥ 2. Note that when α(q) > 1 the net marginal benefit of an additional loan, represented by qu (q), is decreasing in q, implying k +1 (q +1 ) and the interest rate 1+i +1 =
are both decreasing in q +1 -see (23). Therefore, a high (low) capital investment today is followed tomorrow by a low (high) price, a low (high) interest rate and a high (low) consumption. Observe in (22) and (23) that the borrowing limit zk +1 is more sensitive to consumption q +1 for a larger liquidation value of collateral z and capital investment k +1 is more sensitive to consumption for a lower elasticity of the marginal product of capital θ -G (·) is decreasing in z ∈ (z, z) and increasing in θ ∈ (0, ∞) when α(·) > 1. Hence, when the constraint is binding, the condition G (q s ) < −1 to guarantee a periodic cycle requires a relatively higher critical value α z for lower (or higher) values of z (or θ).
We now consider the case where the liquidity function q = G(q +1 ) is monotone, i.e., G −1 is a function. For this purpose, we assume α(q) = α for all q ≥ 0. If α < 1 then both (0, 0) and (q s , q s ) are a solution to (21), satisfying 0 < G −1 (0) < 1 < G −1 (q s ) for all z ∈ (z, 1]. In this case, a dynamic equilibrium exists that stays in (0, q s ) and converges to 0 for any given initial value q 0 ∈ (0, q s ). As Lemma 1 shows, the existence of a periodic solution requires α > 1. In this case it holds that G −1 (q) < 0 for all q ≥ 0 and (q s , q s ) is the only solution to (21). A trivial extension of Proposition 1 implies, for z ∈ (z, 1] a local bifurcation can occur in consumption near the unique monetary steady state equilibrium q s if and only if α ∈ (2 − , 2), > 0. For z ∈ (z, z], denoting αz ,θ = α z,θ for z =z and α z,θ = α z,θ for z = z, we have:
igure 1: Flip bifurcation with α ∈ (αz ,θ , α z,θ ) and z ∈ (z α,θ − , z α,θ ) Proposition 2 Given α ∈ (αz ,θ , α z,θ ), there exists a critical value z α,θ ∈ (z, z) such that a periodic solution, q l , q h ∈ (0, q * ) satisfying q l < q s < q h and k l , k h ∈ (k * , ∞) satisfying k l < k s < k h , exists if and only if z ∈ (z α,θ − , z α,θ ), > 0. Further, the critical value z α,θ is decreasing in α ∈ (αz ,θ , α z,θ ) and increasing in θ ∈ (0, ∞).
The proposition shows, a local bifurcation can occur in both consumption and capital investment when the constraint is binding. Specifically, given α ∈ (αz ,θ , α z,θ ), when the liquidation value z, which is our bifurcation parameter, crosses a critical value z θ , a period-doubling (aka flip) bifurcation occurs and a periodic orbit emerges in a neighborhood of the steady statesee Figure 1 . The critical value z α,θ is decreasing (increasing) in α (in θ) because, when the constraint is binding, the liquidity demand G(·) is more sensitive to consumption with higher liquidation values of collateral z, lower elasticity of the marginal product of capital θ, and higher risk aversion α. Indeed, the asymptotic stability of the local periodic solution can be established for a relatively mild curvature of the liquidity function.
Proposition 3 The periodic solution described in Proposition 2 is asymptotically stable for θ ∈ [1, ∞).
As the liquidation value of capital z drops from its full value to cross the critical value, a stable cycle of order two can emerge around the steady state, which in turn becomes unstable. 
Stationary Sunspots
We introduce extrinsic uncertainty (following the tradition of Cass and Shell (1983) ). There are many ways to construct sunspot equilibria but we only present one example that helps better understand our results. For this purpose, we show below stationary sunspots within the case where the credit constraint is binding, assuming z ∈ (z,z]. The non-binding case for z ∈ (z, 1] is immediate from the analysis below. Suppose that a sunspot event may occur (a) or not (b) following a Markov transition probability,
where ψ j , j ∈ {a, b}, is the probability that state j will occur in the next period if j has occurred in the current period. Suppose agents believe future prices and interest rates to be perfectly correlated with the stationary sunspot activity. A (proper) stationary sunspot equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium where such belief is fulfilled. The maximization problem of the individual is stated in terms of expected values and the equilibrium is indexed by state a, b, which must satisfy
for j = j , where k(q j ) is defined by
and similarly k(q j ) is. When ψ j = 0 it holds that G j (q j , q j ) = G(q +1 ) (defined in (21) without sunspots) with q +1 = q j , and when ψ j = 0 it holds that G j (q j , q j ) = G(q +1 ) with
(24) with a degenerate case ψ a = ψ b = 0. As the equilibrium system (24) defined over j and j , is continuous in (ψ j , ψ j ), the equilibrium system, which is generically regular at the periodic orbit, has a solution q j , k j > 0 for ψ j > 0, j = a, b close to zero. Further, notice that the local bifurcation established in the previous section implies a local indeterminacy, thereby there exists an infinitely many local stationary sunspot equilibria near the steady state for all ψ j ∈ (0, 1), j = a, b (see Figure 4) . To sum up, Proposition 4 (Stationary Sunspots) Assume periodic solutions of order two exist. There exist a stationary sunspot equilibrium for ψ j > 0, j = a, b close to zero, and local stationary sunspot equilibria in every neighborhood of the steady state for all ψ j > 0, j = a, b. In both of the equilibria, only consumption is randomized when z ∈ (z, 1] and both consumption and capital investment are randomized when z ∈ (z,z]. arise in pure exchange models with a strong income effect in the saving function (Grandmont (1985) ) and in production economies with low substitutability between the inputs used for production (Reichlin (1986) ). Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) 
Discussion
Conclusion
Using a simple monetary search model with bank loans, we have shown that consumption, capital and interest rates can undergo upswings and downturns in the presence of collateral constraints. Fluctuations are unambiguously inefficient in this economy. One policy implication would be that if the central bank were to shrink the money supply at the appropriate rate -the rate at which agents discount the future -, then fluctuations would be prevented from occurring and the resulting allocation would be efficient.
Proof of Theorem 1
Within this proof we refer to the steady state without using the superscript s. As mentioned in the main text, the equilibrium system to identify the steady state q, k, i > 0 can be reduced to:
Below we proceed in three steps. In
Step 1 and 2, we show that if zk * ≤
, then equilibrium is with binding credit constraint and a unique solution q ≤q, k > k * , i > 0 exists for z ∈ (z, 1] = ∅. Otherwise, Step 3 shows that equilibrium is without binding credit constraint and the unique solution is q =q, k = k * , i = (1 − β)/β > 0. Given this solution,
Step 4 shows the night-time net consumption is positive x − e > 0 for both buyers and sellers. Therefore, this solution satisfies all the equilibrium requirements and so describes the unique steady state equilibrium.
Step 1 If zk * ≤ (1−σ)q β , then equilibrium must be with binding credit constraint.
Proof of Step 1. Suppose the constraint is slack, i.e., zk > (1 − σ)(1 + i)q. Then, u (q) = 1 + i. (A1) and (A2) determine q =q and k = k * , respectively, where 1 = βu (q) and 1 = βF (k * ). However, this solution implies zk = zk * ≤ (1−σ)q β = (1−σ)u (q)q = (1−σ)(1+i)q, a contradiction to the slack constraint.
Step 2 If zk * ≤ (1−σ)q β , then a solution to (A1),(A2),(A3), satisfying q ≤q, k ≥ k * , i > 0, exists and is unique for a non-empty interval, z ∈ (z, 1]. Proof of Step 2. As shown above, an equilibrium, if it exists, must be with binding constraint for zk * ≤ 
Note that i > 0 ⇐⇒ q > q where u (q) = (1 − β(1 − σ))/σβ. Observe that:
The last inequality follows from φ (z) < 0, φ(0) = 1 > 0, and φ(1) = β(1 − F (q(1 − σ))) < 0 (by our assumption 1 < F (q (1 − σ) , it is sufficient to notice that
and φ (·) < 0 imply z < , then the unique solution is q =q and the constraint is just binding, implying 1 + i = u (q) > 1 and k = k * .
Step 3 If zk * > (1−σ)q β , then equilibrium must be without binding credit constraint and a solution to (A1),(A2),(A3), satisfying q =q, k = k * , i > 0, exists and is unique.
Proof of Step 3. Suppose the constraint is binding, i.e., zk = (1 − σ)(1 + i)q. Then, u (q) > 1 + i and equilibrium must satisfy (A4). As shown above, however, there is no solution q <q to (A4) for zk * > (1−σ)q β . Therefore, if equilibrium exists then it must be without binding constraint, in which case (A1) and (A2) determine q =q and k = k * , respectively, and the binding constraint determines 1 + i > 1.
Step 4 For q ∈ (q,q], k ≥ k * , i > 0, the night-time net consumption is positive x − e > 0 for both buyers and sellers.
Proof of Step 4. The night-time budget constraint (1) implies that an agent who has been a buyer should satisfy
where the second equality follows from the fact that buyers do not hold money when entering the night market, φ = σq/M and l = M (1 − σ)/σ, and the third inequality from the fact that equilibrium is with binding constraint if and only if zk * ≤q(1 − σ)/β, k ≥ k * and 1 + i = u (q) = 1/β. The last inequality is by our assumption. Hence, buyers have a positive night-time net consumption. This further implies, sellers also have x − e > 0 because they enter the night market with a positive money holding and deposit.
Proof of Corollary 1
From (A4), ∂Φ(q, z) ∂z = −βσ βu (q) − 1 1 − βσu (q) + βF (·) q (1 − βσu (q)) βz 2 < 0.
As ∂Φ(q, z)/∂q > 0, this implies dq/dz > 0. Remember that the binding constraint implies 1 + i = (1 − βσu (q)) /β(1 − σ) and zk = q (1 − βσu (q)) /β. It then follows that:
Proof of Lemma 1
For z ∈ (z, 1], it holds that G (q +1 ) = −βu (q +1 ) [α(q +1 ) − 1] < 0 if and only if α(q +1 ) > 1. For z ∈ (z,z], combining (22) and (23),
if and only if α(q +1 ) > 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
The assumption qu(q) = 0 and α(q) < 1 at q = 0 guarantee that the map q = G(q +1 ), which is continuous, should satisfy G(0) = 0 and G (0) = +∞. At the same time, the inversion satisfies G −1 (0) = 0. This implies, if G (q s ) < −1 (i.e., if G −1 (q s ) ∈ (−1, 0)) then there exist points q l = G(q h ) = G −1 (q h ) that satisfy q l < q s < q h ∈ (0, ∞). We now show there exists a critical value α z,θ ∈ [2, ∞) such that G (q s > 0 for any q +1 ∈ (0, ∞), implying the critical value α z,θ ≥ 2 should be increasing (decreasing) in θ ∈ (0, ∞) (in z ∈ (z,z]).
